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Abstract
Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by
the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning
bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there
are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the
bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers n   k
gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear
rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an
object to the marginal winner.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D44, D82.
Keywords: Auctions, Lowest-Winning Bid, Highest-Losing Bid, k-th Price Auction, (k+1)-st
Price Auction.
1 Introduction
Uniform-price auctions have been extensively used for the sale of homogeneous goods in
several countries (e.g., in the sale of Treasury bills and electrical power). In these auctions, the
price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-
price auctions, on the other hand, assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid (e.g.,
1We would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. Claudio Mezzetti thanks the Univer-
sity of Leicester, his home institution when this project was started. Ilia Tsetlin is grateful to the Centre for
Decision Making and Risk Analysis at INSEAD for supporting this project.
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Milgrom, 1981, Weber, 1983, Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 1997, 2000, Milgrom and Weber,
2000, Kremer, 2002, Jackson and Kremer, 2004, 2006, and Mezzetti, Pekeµc and Tsetlin,
2007). When bidders have unit-demand, highest-losing-bid, multi-unit auctions behave very
much like the second-price auction with a single item for sale. In particular, in a symmetric
equilibrium, each bidder bids his expected value for an object conditional on being tied with
the price setter. This simplicity is the main reason for their use by theorists. A natural
question then is: do lowest-winning-bid auctions behave very di¤erently from highest-losing-
bid auctions? Do the two auction formats yield similar behavior and prices as the number
of bidders increases? An a¢ rmative answer to both questions would provide justication for
the theoristsfocus on the analytically simpler highest-losing-bid auctions.
First, we derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction in the
general a¢ liated value model with unit demand introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982);
as far as we know, we are the rst to study such auctions. Then we show that the bidding
functions of the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auction converge as the number
of losing bidders grows large. More precisely, letting n be the number of bidders and k the
number of objects sold, we show that the two bidding functions converge if and only if n  k
goes to innity. As n   k grows, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate. We also
show that the prices in the two auctions converge in probability when n  k goes to innity.
They converge to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner; hence, the two
auctions become perfectly competitive markets as n  k grows.
It is worth to point out two other properties of the lowest-winning bid auction. As it
is well known, in the general a¢ liated model, the second-price auction and its generaliza-
tion, the highest-losing-bid auction, have a continuum of undominated asymmetric equilibria
(Milgrom, 1981, Bikhchandani and Riley, 1991). The rst-price auction and, we conjecture,
the lowest-winning-bid auction, do not su¤er from this problem (McAdams, 2006). Sec-
ond, it is easy to extend the arguments rst introduced by Robinson (1985) for the rst
and second-price auction, and show that collusive agreements are easier to sustain in the
highest-losing-bid than in the lowest-winning-bid auction. In a highest-losing-bid auction,
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cartel members have no incentive to deviate from an agreement in which only one of the
highest value members submits a meaningful bid. On the contrary, cartel members will
want to deviate from such an agreement in a lowest-winning bid auction. The robustness to
collusion and equilibrium multiplicity may help to explain the prevalence in practice of the
lowest-winning-bid auction. That its equilibrium converges to the symmetric equilibrium of
the highest-losing-bid auction makes us feel condent that the latter is a good approximation
of the uniform auctions used in practice, at least when the number n  k of losing bidders is
large.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and derives
the bidding function of the k-th price (i.e., the lowest-winning bid) auction for k objects.
Section 3 studies the convergence properties of the k-th and (k+1)-st price auctions. Section
4 concludes. An appendix contains the proofs omitted from the main text.
2 The Model and Bidding Functions
We consider a sequence of auctions fArg1r=1, where the r-th auction has nr bidders and
kr objects, with 1  kr < nr < nr+1. Each bidder is risk neutral and only demands one
object. Bidder i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; nr, observes the realization xi of a signal Xi. Denote with
s = (x1; :::; xnr) the vector of signal realizations. Let s_ s0 be the component-wise maximum
and s ^ s0 be the component-wise minimum of s and s0. Signals are real random variables
drawn from a distribution with a joint pdf fr(s), which satises the a¢ liation property
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982):
fr(s _ s0)fr(s ^ s0)  fr(s)fr(s0) for all s 6= s0: (1)
The support of fr is [x; x]nr , with  1 < x < x < +1.
We make the standard assumption that the random variables X1; X2; : : : are symmetric.
More precisely, the innite sequence X = (X1; X2; :::) is exchangeable; that is, for all nite
n the joint distribution of (X1 ;    ; Xn) is the same as that of (X1;    ; Xn) for all permu-
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tations . By de Finettis exchangeability theorem (e.g., see Kingman, 1978, for a simple
exposition) there exists a real random variable  with distribution H() and a conditional
distribution function G(j) such that, for all n, the joint distribution of the random variables
X1; X2;    ; Xn is:
P (X1  x1; X2  x2;    ; Xn  xn) =
Z +1
 1
G(x1j)G(x2j)   G(xnj)dH(): (2)
We will make the following uniform boundedness assumption. There exists 0 > 0 such
that, for all x, x0, and :2
0 <
g(xj)
g(x0j) <
1
0
; (3)
where g(j) is the density of G(j):
The value V ir = ur(Xi; fXjgj 6=i) of an object to bidder i is a function of all signals.3
The function ur() is non-negative, di¤erentiable, strictly increasing in Xi, increasing and
symmetric in the other bidderssignals Xj, j 6= i:
In studying the symmetric equilibrium bidding function in a given auction, it is useful to
take the point of view of one of the bidders, say bidder 1 with signal X1 = x, and to consider
the order statistics associated with the signals of all other bidders. We denote with Y jr the
j-th highest signal of bidders 2; 3; :::; nr (i.e., all bidders except bidder 1). Dene
vjr(x; y) = E

V 1r jX1 = x; Y jr = y

: (4)
A¢ liation implies that vjr(x; y) is increasing in both x and y, and hence di¤erentiable almost
everywhere (Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Theorem 5). We also assume that there exist real
2This assumption implies that a bidders signal only conveys a bounded amount of information about the
other bidderssignals. Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) make a similar assumption in the context of pure
common values.
3Milgrom and Weber (1982) also allowed the function ur to depend on other signals which are not observed
by the bidders. Since we never use the unobserved signals, we have omitted them. This is with no loss of
generality. For example, the case of an unobserved common value corresponds in our model to a function
ur which is symmetric in all signals and equals the expected value of the object conditional on the signals
observed by all the bidders.
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numbers a > 0 and b <1 such that, for all r:
a <
dvkrr (x; x)
dx
< b: (5)
In a (kr + 1)-st price (or highest-losing-bid) auction, the kr bidders with the highest
bids win at a price equal to the (kr + 1)-st highest bid. Milgrom (1981) showed that the
bidding function in such an auction is vkrr (x; x). Bidder 1 bids his expected value of an object
conditional on his own signal, X1 = x, and on his signal being just high enough to guarantee
winning (i.e., being equal to the kr-th highest signal of all other bidders).
In a kr-th price (or lowest-winning-bid) auction, the kr bidders with the highest bids
win an object at a price equal to the kr-th highest bid. In studying equilibrium of such an
auction, it is useful to consider another bidder besides bidder 1, say bidder 2 with signal
X2 = y. Denote the signals of bidders 3; : : : ; nr, ordered descendingly, by Z1r ; : : : ; Z
nr 2
r .
Let fX2r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr ) be the density of X2 conditional on X1 = x and
Zkr 1r > y > Z
kr
r ; let F
X2
r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr ) be the corresponding cumulative
distribution function.4 Dene the functions
Qr(y; x) = (nr   kr) f
X2
r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
FX2r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
; (6)
Lr(z) = e
  R xz Qr(t;t)dt: (7)
The following lemma is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 The increasing symmetric equilibrium of the lowest-winning-bid auction for kr
objects with nr bidders is:
br(x) = v
kr
r (x; x) 
Z x
x
Lr(z)dv
kr
r (z; z); (8)
where vkrr () is dened by (4) and Lr(z) is dened by (7).
4If kr = 1, we let Zkr 1r = x; in such a case the kr-th price auction is the rst-price auction.
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In the lowest-winning-bid auction, a bidder bids his expected value of the object, con-
ditional on being tied with the marginal (or highest bidding) loser, minus a shading factor.
This is similar to the equilibrium bidding function of a rst-price auction when there is a
single object for sale.
3 Convergence
We now study the convergence of the bidding function br(x) of the lowest-winning-bid auction
to the bidding function vkrr (x; x) of the highest-losing-bid auction, as r grows large.
Theorem 1 The bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction, br(x) given by (8), con-
verges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction, vkrr (x; x) given by (4), if and
only if the number of losing bidders nr   kr goes to innity. When nr   kr goes to innity,
br(x) converges to vkrr (x; x) at a linear rate.
Proof. By (8) and (6):
br(x)  vkrr (x; x) =  
Z x
x
Lr(z)dv
kr
r (z; z)
=  
Z x
x
e 
R x
z Qr(t;t)dtdvkrr (z; z)
=  
Z x
x
e
 (nr kr)
R x
z
f
X2
r (tjX1=t;Zkr 1r >t>Zkrr )
F
X2
r (tjX1=t;Zkr 1r >t>Zkrr )
dt
dvkrr (z; z):
By the mean value theorem, there exists t0 such that:
fX2r (tjX1 = t; Zkr 1r > t > Zkrr )
FX2r (tjX1 = t; Zkr 1r > t > Zkrr )
=
fX2r (tjX1 = t; Zkr 1r > t > Zkrr )
(t  x)fX2r (t0jX1 = t; Zkr 1r > t > Zkrr )
:
Since fr(xi; x i) =
R +1
 1 g(x1j)g(x2j)    g(xnr j)dH(), it is simple to show that the
boundedness assumption (3) implies that, for all r, xi, x0i, and x i = (x1;    ; xi 1; xi+1;    ; xnr):
0 <
fr(xi; x i)
fr(x0i; x i)
<
1
0
: (9)
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It follows from (9) that
0 <
fX2r (tjX1 = t; Zkr 1r > t > Zkrr )
fX2r (t0jX1 = t; Zkr 1r > t > Zkrr )
<
1
0
;
and hence
 
Z x
x
e (nr kr)0
R x
z
1
(t x)dtdvkrr (z; z)  br(x)  vkrr (x; x)   
Z x
x
e
 (nr kr) 10
R x
z
1
(t x)dtdvkrr (z; z);
(10)
with the inequalities being strict for x 6= x.
Observe that   R x
z
1
(t x)dt = ln
z x
x x ; it then follows from (10) that
 
Z x
x

z   x
x  x
(nr kr)0 dvkrr (z; z)
dz
dz  br(x) vkrr (x; x)   
Z x
x

z   x
x  x
(nr kr) 10 dvkrr (z; z)
dz
dz:
(11)
Since dv
kr
r (z;z)
dz
is uniformly bounded by assumption (5), the left and right hand side of (11)
converge linearly to zero if and only if nr kr goes to innity. This shows that br(x) converges
to vkrr (x; x) if and only if nr kr goes to innity, and that convergence is at a linear rate.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is the following. In a kr-th price auction for kr objects, a
bidder bids the expected value of the object, conditional on his bid being tied with the bid of
the marginal loser, minus a shading factor. As the number of losers in the auction increases,
the shading factor decreases linearly, reecting increased competition for the last object. In
the limit, the bid in the kr-th price auction coincides with the bid in the (kr + 1)-st price
auction: the expected value of the object conditional on being tied with the marginal loser.
In a (kr + 1)-st price auction, the marginal loser is the price setter.
We now show that the prices in the two auctions converge in probability, and they converge
to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner. This is because the kr-th and the
(kr + 1)-st order statistic converge in probability as nr   kr grows large.
Let Xjr be the j-th highest signal among all bidders in auction Ar. Consider the marginal
winner in auction r, the bidder with the kr-th highest signal; his expected value for an object
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conditional on his signal being x is E

vkrr (x;X
kr+1
r )jXkrr = x

:
Theorem 2 The prices of the lowest-winning-bid auction and the highest-losing-bid auction
converge in probability when nr   kr goes to innity; they converge to the expected value of
an object to the marginal winner.
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that the (kr + 1)-st order statistic (i.e., Xkr+1) converges
to the kr-th order statistic in probability when nr   kr grows large. To see this note rst
that the price in a kr-th price auction is br(Xkr), while the price in a (kr + 1)-st price
auction is vkrr (X
kr+1
r ; X
kr+1
r ): By Theorem 1, the prices converge when the order statistics
converge. Second, the expected value of an object to the marginal winner with signal x,
E

vkrr (x;X
kr+1
r )jXkrr = x

, converges to vkrr (x; x) if the order statistics converge.
Fix an arbitrary " > 0: By (2), the probability that the di¤erence between the kr-th and
the (kr + 1)-st order statistic is more than ", conditional on the kr-th order statistic being
equal to x, is given by
Pr(X
kr
r  Xkr+1r > "jXkrr = x) (12)
=
R +1
 1

G(x "j)
G(xj)
nr kr
(1 G(xj))kr 1 g(xj)G(xj)nr krdH()R +1
 1 (1 G(xj))kr 1 g(xj)G(xj)nr krdH()
:
The boundedness assumption (3) implies that there is a real number c such that 0 < c <
g(xj) for all x and . This implies that, for all x and :
G(x  "j)
G(xj)  max

G(xj)  "c
G(xj) ; 0

 max f1  "c; 0g :
It follows that
Pr(X
kr
r  Xkr+1r > "jXkrr = x)  (max f1  "c; 0g)nr kr ;
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and hence Pr(Xkrr  Xkr+1r > ") goes to zero as nr   kr goes to innity. This concludes the
proof.5
Dene an auction as being competitive if the price converges to the value of an object
to the marginal buyer as the number of losers grows. Theorem 2 shows that the kr-th and
(kr + 1)-st uniform-price auction are competitive.6
4 Conclusions
This paper provides a link between the highest-losing-bid auctions, which have been exten-
sively studied by theorists, and the lowest-winning-bid auctions that are used in practice.
We have shown that the symmetric equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid
auction converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the
number of losing bidders gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the two bidding
functions converge at a linear rate and prices in the two auctions converge in probability to
the willingness to pay of the marginal bidder (his expected value for an object).
In a pure common value model with signals that are independent conditional on the
common value, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) showed that the (k + 1)-st price auction
aggregates information (i.e., the price converges to the common value in probability) if and
only if the number of objects k and the number of losers n  k go to innity. The results in
this paper, specialized to such a pure common value model, imply that the k-th price auction
aggregates information under the same conditions. In particular, if n k goes to innity, but
5Note that the kr-th and the (kr + 1)-st order statistic converge even if nr   kr does not go to innity,
provided that nr converges to innity. If nr goes to innity, but nr   kr does not, then kr must converge to
innity. We can then write an expression for Pr(Xkrr  Xkr+1r > "jXkr+1r = x) similar to (12):
Pr(X
kr
r  Xkr+1r > "jXkr+1r = x) =
R +1
 1

1 G(x+"j)
1 G(xj)
kr
(1 G(xj))kr g(xj)G(xj)nr kr 1dH()R +1
 1 (1 G(xj))kr g(xj)G(xj)nr kr 1dH()
;
which converges to zero uniformly as kr goes to innity.
6Our denition of a competitive auction is di¤erent from the denition in Kremer (2002). In a model with
pure common values, he calls an auction competitive if the expected price converges to the expected value
of the object. Our denition conforms more closely with the standard denition of a competitive market by
economists and applies beyond the common-value setting.
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k stays nite, then the expected value of an object to the marginal winner does not converge,
in probability, to the objects common value.
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Appendix
In this appendix we prove Lemma 1, which gives us the equilibrium bidding function of the
kr-th price auction. We begin with two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 2 Qr(y; x), dened by (6), is increasing in x.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 1 in Milgrom and Weber
(1982). By a¢ liation, for any y0 < y and x0 < x,
fX2r (yjX1 = x0; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
fX2r (y0jX1 = x0; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
 f
X2
r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
fX2r (y0jX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
:
Cross multiplying and integrating with respect to y0 over the range x  y0 < y yields the
result.
Let f jr (yjjX1 = x) be the marginal density of Y jr conditional on X1 = x.
Lemma 3 Qr(y; x), dened by (6), can equivalently be dened as follows:
Qr(y; x) =
fkrr (yjx)
Pr(Y krr < y < Y
kr 1
r jx)
;
where Pr(Y krr < y < Y
kr 1
r jx) is the probability that, conditional on X1 = x, Y krr is below y
and Y kr 1r is above y.
Proof. Because of the symmetry of the (nr   1) signals X2; : : : ; Xnr , it is
fkrr (yjX1 = x)
= (nr 1)

nr   2
kr   1
Z y
x
:::
Z y
x
Z x
y
:::
Z x
y
fr(y; z1;    ; znr 2jX1 = x)dz1    dzkr 1

dzkr    dznr 2;
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and
Pr(Y
kr
r < y < Y
kr 1
r jX1 = x)
=

nr   1
kr   1
Z y
x
::
Z y
x
Z x
y
::
Z x
y
fr(y1; ::; ynr 1jX1 = x)dy1::dykr 1

dykr ::dynr 1
=

nr   1
kr   1
Z y
x
Z y
x
::
Z y
x
Z x
y
::
Z x
y
fr(x2; z1; ::; znr 2jX1 = x)dz1::dzkr 1

dzkr ::dznr 2dx2:
As a result, it is
fkrr (yjX1 = x)
Pr(Y krr < y < Y
kr 1
r jX1 = x)
=
(nr   1)
 
nr 2
kr 1
 R y
x
:::
R y
x
R x
y
:::
R x
y
fr(y; z1;    ; znr 2jX1 = x)dz1    dzkr 1

dzkr    dznr 2 
nr 1
kr 1
 R y
x
R y
x
::
R y
x
R x
y
::
R x
y
fr(x2; z1; ::; znr 2jX1 = x)dz1::dzkr 1

dzkr ::dznr 2dx2
= (nr   kr) f
X2
r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
FX2r (yjX1 = x; Zkr 1r > y > Zkrr )
= Qr(y; x);
where the last equality follows from (6).
Consider bidder 1 observing signal x. Bidding according to the function b() corresponds
to a symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if the expected payo¤of the bidder who observes
signal x is maximized at b = b(x), when all other bidders follow b().
Dene
vkr 1;krr (x; ykr 1; ykr) = E[V
1
r jX1 = x; Y kr 1r = ykr 1; Y krr = ykr ]:
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The expected payo¤(b;x) of bidder 1, who observes signal x and bids b, while all other
bidders follow b(), is:7
(b;x) = E[
 
V 1r   b(Y kr 1r )

Ib(Y kr 1r )<bjX1 = x] + E[
 
V 1r   b

Ib(Y krr )<b<b(Y kr 1r )jX1 = x]
= E[E[
 
V 1r   b(Y kr 1r )

Ib(Y kr 1r )<bjX1; Y kr 1r ]jX1 = x]
+E[E[
 
V 1r   b

Ib(Y krr )<b<b(Y kr 1r )jX1; Y kr 1r ; Y krr ]jX1 = x]
= E[
 
vkr 1r (X1; Y
kr 1
r )  b(Y kr 1r )

Ib(Y kr 1r )<bjX1 = x]
+E[
 
vkr 1;krr (X1; Y
kr 1
r ; Y
kr
r )  b

Ib(Y krr )<b<b(Y kr 1r )jX1 = x]
=
Z b 1 (b)
x
 
vkr 1r (x; ykr 1)  b(ykr 1)

fkr 1r (ykr 1jX1 = x)dykr 1
+
Z b 1 (b)
x
Z x
b 1 (b)
 
vkr 1;krr (x; ykr 1; ykr)  b

fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x)dykr 1dykr ;
where fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x) is the joint density of Y kr 1 and Y kr conditional on X1 = x.
Let
1(b;x) =
Z b 1 (b)
x
 
vkr 1r (x; ykr 1)  b(ykr 1)

fkr 1r (ykr 1jX1 = x)dykr 1;
2(b;x) =
Z b 1 (b)
x
Z x
b 1 (b)
 
vkr 1;krr (x; ykr 1; ykr)  b

fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x)dykr 1dykr ;
so that
(b;x) = 1(b;x) + 2(b;x):
The derivative of 1(b;x) with respect to b is
1b(b;x) =
1
b0(b 1(b))

vkr 1r (x; b
 1(b))  b

fkr 1r (b
 1(b)jX1 = x);
7Ib(Y kr 1)<b is an indicator function: it equals one if b(Y kr 1) < b and zero otherwise.
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and the derivative of 2(b;x) with respect to b is
2b(b;x) =
1
b0(b 1(b))
Z x
b 1 (b)

vkr 1;krr (x; ykr 1; b
 1(b))  b

fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; b
 1(b)jX1 = x)dykr 1
  1
b0(b 1(b))
Z b 1 (b)
x

vkr 1;krr (x; b
 1(b); ykr)  b

fkr 1;krr (b
 1(b); ykr jX1 = x)dykr
 
Z b 1 (b)
x
Z x
b 1 (b)
fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x)dykr 1dykr
=
1
b0(b 1(b))

vkrr (x; b
 1(b))  b

fkrr (b
 1(b)jX1 = x)
  1
b0(b 1(b))

vkr 1r (x; b
 1(b))  b

fkr 1r (b
 1(b)jX1 = x)
 
Z b 1 (b)
x
Z x
b 1 (b)
fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x)dykr 1dykr :
Therefore, the derivative of b(b;x) with respect to b is
b(b;x) =

vkrr (x; b
 1(b))  b

fkrr (b
 1(b)jX1 = x)
b0(b 1(b))
(13)
 
Z b 1 (b)
x
Z x
b 1 (b)
fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x)dykr 1dykr :
Note that the expression
R y
x
R x
y
fkr 1;krr (ykr 1; ykr jX1 = x)dykr 1dykr is equal to
Pr(Y
kr
r < y < Y
kr 1
r jX1 = x), the probability that Y krr is below y and Y kr 1r is above y,
conditional on X1 = x: Therefore, by setting b(b; x)jb=b(x) = 0, the di¤erential equation for
the candidate for an increasing symmetric equilibrium is
1
b0(x)
 
vkrr (x; x)  b(x)

fkrr (xjX1 = x)  Pr(Y krr < x < Y kr 1r jX1 = x) = 0;
or
b0(x) =
 
vkrr (x; x)  b(x)
 fkrr (xjX1 = x)
Pr(Y krr < x < Y
kr 1
r jx)
: (14)
14
By Lemma 3, we can then write (14) as
b0(x) =

vkrr (x; x)  b(x)

Qr(x; x): (15)
Using the integrating factor e 
R x
x Qr(t;t)dt, and the boundary condition b(x) = vkrr (x; x), the
solution of this di¤erential equation is:
b(x) = vkrr (x; x)e
  R xx Qr(t;t)dt +
Z x
x
vkrr (z; z)Qr(z; z)e
  R xz Qr(t;t)dtdz:
Integrating by parts and using (7) yield (8).
It only remains to show that deviations from (8) are not protable. From (13), by setting
b
 1
(b) = y, we get
b(b;x) =
1
b0(y)
 
vkrr (x; y)  b(y)

fkrr (yjX1 = x)  Pr(Y krr < y < Y kr 1r jX1 = x)
=
fkrr (yjX1 = x)
b0(y)

vkrr (x; y)  b(y) 
b0(y)
Qr(y; x)

:
By Lemma 2, Qr(y; x) is increasing in x, so b(b;x) is positive for x > y and negative for
x < y, which implies that setting b = b(x) = br(x)maximizes the expected payo¤of bidder 1.
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